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SUMMARY
RESOLUTION OF TRANSFER PRICING DISPUTES
1. Introduction of the research project
The research focuses on the various procedures for transfer pricing dispute
resolution existing at an international level between states and taxpayers. These
procedures, successively, are the advance pricing agreement procedure (hereafter
also referred to as: APA procedure), the mutual agreement procedure and the
arbitration procedure (hereafter referred to as: the transfer pricing procedures).
The list ought to be nuanced in the sense that the first procedure is not so much
concerned with the resolution of these disputes as with the prevention of them.
Nevertheless, this study also analyses the advance pricing agreement, as this
procedure is nationally and internationally considered to be an important factor
for dispute resolution in the transfer pricing area.
The objective of the research is to determine to what extent the current transfer
pricing procedures provide a fair and also sufficiently efficient and effective
framework for the resolution of cross-border transfer pricing disputes. The answer
to the central question will be based on an evaluation of the dispute resolution
framework against the higher national and international standards of fair trial and
on stocktaking research (i) into the results acquired with the procedures at
national and international level, (ii) into the present national and international
legal basis for its implementation, and (iii) into the changes in the procedures that
were over the years introduced. Next, the study identifies the main issues in the
dispute resolution framework paying equal attention to each of the transfer pricing
procedures. Finally, the study offers, for the purpose of a continuing and positive
development of the transfer pricing procedures, recommendations that can solve
the identified issues and that can, in particular, create a framework for the
resolving cross-border transfer pricing disputes that responds better to the criteria
of fairness, efficiency and effectiveness.
2. Description of the research project
The study is organized into three parts that reflect the various stages of the
research together with the corresponding research objectives and methods:
Part I The current transfer pricing procedures
Part II In-depth analysis of the dispute resolution framework
Part III Recommendations and an alternative dispute resolution framework
The objective of part I (chapters 2 to 4) is to provide a clear insight into the
backgrounds, the design and the Dutch practice of the transfer pricing procedures
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by means of research in the areas of legal history and positive law. Each of these
chapters concludes with stocktaking quantitative research into the results acquired
with the various procedures at national and international level and the national
and international legal basis for the execution of the procedures (appendices 1 to 7).
For the purpose of comparison with the Dutch practice, the practices of three
important trade partners of the Netherlands that are also representatives of three
prominent ‘transfer pricing continents’, viz. Germany, Japan and the United States of
America, are also considered (extern comparative law research).
Part II (chapters 5 and 6) examines the mutual consultation model, which under-
lies the APA procedure as well as the mutual agreement procedure, and inter-
national arbitration. Notwithstanding the fact that the mutual agreement
procedure and the arbitration procedure are not included in the traditional judicial
system, on account of their key position – viz. final resolution in cross-border
transfer pricing disputes (as for this kind of disputes there are neither national nor
international alternatives available) –, the study gives an in-depth analysis of them
on the basis of the principles of a fair trial as enshrined in article 6 ECHR and as
developed in ECHR case law (see in detail chapter 5, section 5.1 and chapter 6,
section 6.1). For the evaluation of the arbitration procedure the study also
considers so-called legal cornerstones of arbitration, which are normally taken
as a starting point in international commercial situations. The analysis follows the
ideal image of the transfer pricing procedures as set out in the introductory
chapter in which they qualify as fair, and also as efficient and effective methods
of dispute resolution, and that are in due compliance with the aforementioned
principles. Not only for reasons of legal protection is this evaluation against higher
principles indicated – viz. has the taxpayer with the development of the proce-
dures been given an effective instrument for the resolution of cross-border transfer
pricing disputes?–, also legal equality, legal certainty and the development of the
law are guaranteed by these common standards. For the evaluation the author has
chosen the following criteria: fair access to the procedure, impartial and indepen-
dent adjudication, the principle of a fair hearing and adjudication within a
reasonable period of time. Ultimately, the objective of part II is to identify the
main issues in the current dispute resolution framework by means of stocktaking
qualitative research consisting of an evaluation of the changes that were over the
years introduced by the national and supranational institutes concerned (the
Dutch Ministry of Finance, the EU and the OECD).
Finally, part III (chapter 7) answers the central research question namely to what
extent the current transfer pricing procedures provide a fair and sufficiently
efficient and effective framework for the resolution of cross-border transfer pricing
disputes. This part of the study also sheds a light on the national and international
basis for the execution of the procedures and the expected developments. Further,
part III forges together the results of the first and second part of this study, which
leads to a proposal to improve the current dispute resolution framework (design-
based research). This proposal has a twofold scope: to provide (i) recommenda-
tions to improve the various transfer pricing procedures, and (ii) an alternative
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scheme to improve the general framework, in particular the transitional stage from
the mutual agreement procedure to the arbitration procedure. For the purpose of
the design of this alternative scheme, there will be an excursion into the arbitra-
tion rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (hereafter
referred to as: UNCITRAL) and of the International Chamber of Commerce (here-
after referred to as: ICC) (internal comparative law research). The valuable ele-
ments of these rules are incorporated into the design of the new scheme.
3. Summary of the conclusions
The analysis of the transfer pricing procedures in the first and second part of this
study has shown important issues that preclude a positive answer to the central
research question. This does not mean, however, that the procedures, or more
generally spoken, the current dispute resolution framework, after having undergone
some adjustments, could not fulfill the ideal image of fairness, efficiency and
effectiveness or could better comply with these criteria. The research has demon-
strated that the procedures could very well develop into more practical and effective
instruments with which the taxpayer has recourse to decisive legal remedies and
which provide himwith a strong legal position. Below, the author will summarize her
conclusions with regard to the transfer pricing procedures and their main underlying
models, viz. the mutual consultation model and international arbitration (see for a
complete account chapter 5, section 5.6, chapter 6, section 6.6, and chapter 7).
The APA procedure is for the time being the one that is used most frequently out of
the three transfer pricing procedures. In that sense, it can be considered as the
most effective one. By concluding APAs with tax administrations on a national or
international basis, taxpayers enjoy many advantages. By means of APAs, compa-
nies obtain certainty on the way transfer prices within the business group are
applied for the upcoming years and on the degree of acceptability. This certainty
means that important risks are avoided like conflicts with the tax administration
leading to transfer pricing adjustments and, in the worst case, double taxation. An
APA also creates internationally a more certain playing field which improves the
company’s position. It may be added that, once the transfer pricing policy of a
company has been approved of by the tax administration, it establishes a prece-
dent, so that renewal of the agreement could be a simplified process requiring
relatively little documentation to be submitted. The APA procedure thus brings
about significant benefits and therefore it is applied by a large group of companies,
including Dutch multinationals. The requests are in particular concerned with the
acquirement of bilateral APAs, as they regard cross-border transactions and,
consequently, generate the greatest certainty. Smaller companies usually apply
for unilateral APAs given the costs of procedures involving international consulta-
tion. This APA that is acquired via a purely national procedure provides, however,
interesting advantages like certainty within its own state and a better starting
position in the case of an international conflict as the tax authority of the state of
residence has already approved of the taxpayer’s transfer pricing policy. In other
words, the unilateral APA can also be considered a potentially effective and
therefore attractive instrument. This type of APA falls, however, outside the scope
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of this research, that is concerned with dispute resolution between states (see
chapter 1, section 1.5). Only the request of a bilateral or a multilateral APAwill offer
a suitable solution for future conflicts at an international level (and in so far as
there exist old conflicts, the APA can be granted rollback). An APA procedure could,
however, also be started immediately after the successful ending of a mutual
agreement procedure in order to prevent future problems between the states
involved. Because as a part of the preceding consultations, exchange of information
and international discussions have already taken place, the APA procedure is likely
to proceed well. Such a combination of procedures will further improve their
efficiency and effectiveness.
In summary, it can be concluded that the bilateral and the multilateral APA –
although the latter type of APA is used far less frequently as for the time being it
has not a sufficient national and international basis – are effective instruments for
the resolution, or rather, the prevention of cross-border transfer pricing disputes.
Commercial results show that the APA procedure is positively developing as far as
the national part of the procedure is concerned, and that this part may, therefore,
qualify as efficient (in which statistics moreover no distinction is made as for the
various APAs, see appendix 5). The lack of distinction between the types of APAs
and their corresponding chances of success impede the insight into the degree of
success of the bilateral and multilateral APA. The picture is less positive with
regard to the international part of the procedure. The consultation between the
states often is a long-lasting process of several years, also depending on the state to
be consulted and the tax treaty that constitutes the basis for the consultation.
Further, the examination of the mutual agreement procedure in the light of the
principles of a fair trial has given the impression of a procedure that is potentially
promising, but that needs to be strengthened. In its present shape it still has too
many discrepancies with respect to the procedural standards developed by the
ECHR. The question arises, however, to what extent compliance with those
standards should be the result. Realistically, the mutual agreement procedure
will never be in full compliance with them, given the evident character of a
government process. These standards can, however, be used as a basis for the
evaluation of, in particular, the fair character of the procedure and the resulting
options for improvement, as is also argued in the introductory chapter, section 1.3
and 1.4 and in chapter 5, section 5.1. This is particularly necessary as the procedure
bears important features of a judicial trial and, for the time being, no other legal
remedies are available for the resolution of cross-border transfer pricing disputes
(like an international judicial procedure, see chapter 7, section 7.3). For the
improvement of the procedure a balance has to be found between the ECHR
standards and the starting points for a government process, which process has also
clear mainly pragmatic advantages.
The most important advantage and at the same time also the most important
disadvantage of the mutual agreement procedure is its essence, viz. that problems
are solved in an amicable consultation by the authorities of the states involved
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without the participation of an independent third party. Besides, the taxpayer is
left with too little legal protection. The ‘principle of representation’ according to
which the taxpayers’ state of residence stands in for him and as such protects his
interests, does not function optimally, as there is a real risk that the interests of the
states have priority in the search for a suitable solution (the so-called ‘conflict of
interests’). This basis of amicable consultation does not necessarily disqualify the
procedure. The adverse aspects may be compensated, if:
(i) the internal design of the procedure qualifies as a fair trial with which
taxpayers are given a real possibility to resolve their dispute and within which
their legal position is sufficiently guaranteed, and
(ii) taxpayers have the possibility to bring their case before a higher, independent
body that supervises the contents of the mutual agreements and, if required,
reviews these agreements (see on this chapter 7, section 7.4.3, recommenda-
tion 11, and section 7.5.4 – the main procedure of international arbitration), in
the light of the arm’s length principle (and the related transfer pricing
methods) as laid down in the applicable tax convention and the national
regulations (see below the section on international arbitration).
From the in-depth analysis of the mutual consultation model in chapter 5 follows
that the first condition is not yet fulfilled. Mutual consultation still has a too
arbitrary character. The resolution of the dispute, its procedure, its progress and
the position of the taxpayer herein depend too much on (i) the views and practical
experience of the states involved, (ii) national substantive and procedural law, and
(iii) the commitment and involvement of lower government agencies as for
example the presence of subsidiary bodies of transfer pricing experts. The Net-
herlands has seen a positive development of all these aspects. Therefore, the
problems will in particular arise in relationship to other states, for example
problems that may arise in negotiations with less developed treaty partners, and
divergence of views on the substantive interpretation or on the procedural aspects
that may arise in negotiations with more equal partners.
For the sake of transparency, the author has distinguished two levels (see chapter 5,
section 5.6), on which the arbitrary character of the mutual agreement procedure
between states reveals itself. First the ‘micro-level’ that has been discussed in the
first part of the research, namely (i) the design of the transfer pricing procedures of
which this mutual consultation is always a part either as preliminary procedure or
as main procedure, (ii) the problems that arise in the separate procedures, and
(iii) the adjustments that the various procedural stages accordingly need. At this
level also the substantive difficulties of a more economic and technical nature
appear, such as the divergence in transfer pricing methods and the different ways
of their application by the states. Secondly a ‘macro-level’ can be discerned. This
level refers to the current dispute resolution framework and the position the
mutual consultation model has in it. The examination of the mutual consultation
model in chapter 5 has been done without taking into account the technical
implementation difficulties, which enabled a view of the model from a wider
perspective in order to get a good grip on its complexity. This perspective acquired
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through an examination in the light of the principles of a fair trial has unveiled the
essence of the mutual consultation model, which is at the core of the critiques
made on this model, namely that, also given the historical design – states have
strived for maintaining their sovereignty –, the model is susceptible to arbitrary
decisions. Now, if the mutual consultation model needs to become ECHR-proof, the
taxpayers’ legal and procedural interests in particular ought to be protected more
strongly. This can be achieved by strengthening the taxpayers’ rights of defence
and by countering, as far as possible, the difference in legal position between states
and taxpayers during the proceedings. These adjustments should be made in
combination with an appropriate opportunity for review afterwards.
With that, the author comes to her conclusions on international arbitration. The
transition from the mutual agreement procedure to the arbitration procedure, the
access to arbitration, the character and the scope of arbitration, the position of
the arbitrators and the role of the taxpayer in the proceedings need to be improved
for the arbitration procedure to qualify as a fair, efficient and effective procedure.
In order to perform the role of supervisor for the mutual agreement procedure, the
arbitration procedure should acquire a more independent and effective character
and should not (partly) be left to the discretion of the states. Positive qualities,
however, also deserve mentioning as international arbitration has over the years
acquired a more refined format with the development of regulations at a European
and at a more international level, on account of which states are found more and
more inclined to delegate their sovereignty to an arbitration commission. This
development is likely to continue depending, of course, on other more substantive
developments in the transfer pricing practice (see in detail chapter 7, section 7.3).
The use of the arbitration procedure is, however, for the time being a limited one as
is clear from the available statistics (see appendix 5). In actual practice the
procedure seems in particular to have the role of supervisor, as a result of which
the mutual agreement procedure has increased in efficiency and effectiveness. It is
preferable that the arbitration procedure not only has this important preventive
effect, but also flourishes as an independent instrument itself. This is particularly
necessary given the weaknesses of the mutual agreement procedure in its current
form. An arbitration procedure that fulfills the ECHR-standards to a higher degree
ensures that the whole dispute resolution framework will function better, the
mutual agreement procedure can retain its informal and pragmatic character and
the taxpayer acquires a stronger legal position through this reviewmechanism. But
to reach that state, the arbitration procedure still needs a number of adjustments.
Some of these adjustments can be found in the continuum between the mutual
agreement procedure and the arbitration procedure; a separate appeal on the
arbitration procedure ought to be possible under certain conditions (see in detail
chapter 7, section 7.5). Other adjustments require a modification of the arbitration
procedure itself, which is the continuation of an ongoing process, viz. the creation
of a ‘higher’ procedure in which states have less and independent experts more
influence (see in detail chapter 7, section 7.4). For its design consistency and
transparency of rules will be basic. Further, a significant error is the way in which
the arbitration commission has been designed in the various regulations. What is
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remarkable is that this commission, notwithstanding the participation of inde-
pendent experts, may be more or less subjective through the participation of
representatives of the states involved in the conflict. This participation can be
disputable if there is insufficient counterbalance in the sense that these repre-
sentatives are in the majority and that taxpayers, unlike the states, do not have the
right to reject an arbitrator if they suspect certain impartialities for which they can
produce evidence. In short, an arbitration commission can only be sufficiently
objective notwithstanding the participation of the states – which is a somewhat
artificial construction chiefly aimed at maintaining tax sovereignty –, if it includes,
anyhow, a majority of independent members of whom one is president (for
instance, a group of five persons including three independent experts).
The fundamental question that also applies to international arbitration is to what
extent the procedure needs adjustment so that it will comply with the ECHR
standards and the preliminary procedure of mutual consultation will be approved
of as well (see for the latter above, item ii of ‘the adverse aspects of mutual
consultation’). In particular, the question arises to what extent adjustments are
possible in the current transfer pricing practice, in which the arbitration procedure
is already considered to be a large step. Realistically, the arbitration procedure will
never, as has been pointed out in chapter 6 in the introductory section 6.1, be able
to be completely equated with the traditional judicial proceedings and to comply
fully with the ECHR standards. These standards provide, however, appropriate
instruments on the basis of which several different options for improvement can
be suggested (see in detail chapter 7, section 7.4). The examination referred to
seems indicated, given the vital role of arbitration in the dispute resolution
framework as a final instrument for the resolution of transfer pricing disputes,
and also as a review mechanism afterwards. Although it should not be forgotten
that this is a treaty instrument with a corresponding objective, it should as much
as possible be striven for that this procedure is available as a fair and decisive
instrument for the taxpayer. This is particularly necessary because of the lack of a
remedy at national and international level. The arbitration procedure will, there-
fore, have to be developed further within the limits of the procedural rules and
diplomacy, which will require a careful balancing of interests in which the
taxpayer’s legal position should be an important factor. In this consideration so-
called legal cornerstones of international arbitration can play a supporting role, as
will be more fully explained hereafter.
Chapter 6, section 6.1, lists legal cornerstones of international commercial arbitra-
tion. These are: (i) access to the procedure under an arbitration agreement, (ii) free
selection of quality arbitrators under a set of arbitration rules, (iii) proceedings in a
closed session based on the relevant arbitration rules, and (iv) implementation of
the outcome based on national regulations and/or a convention. These corners-
tones, which generally apply in international arbitration, are not all of them
sufficiently safeguarded in the arbitration procedure used in transfer pricing
conflicts. This is not surprising given the design of this procedure of which the
framework is different from what is usual in arbitration. The transfer pricing or,
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more generally, the tax variant of the arbitration procedure as laid down in the tax
treaties is not devised by both parties involved in the conflict (viz. the taxpayers
and the states), but unilaterally designed by the states in accordance with the
provisions agreed between them at treaty level. Here the ‘principle of representa-
tion’ becomes a consideration again: the states are deemed, on behalf of the
taxpayers and in their interest, to agree on an arbitration clause that in due time,
can be used in a cross-border conflict. As argued above, this formula is not
satisfactory. The states have their own interests too, which makes their role
controversial. Therefore, not the comparison against the more general arbitration
procedure in which by common accord parties agree on a clause pursuant to which
in case of a conflict they submit their dispute to, for instance an independent
arbitration institute, should serve as a reference, but rather the comparison with
the traditional judicial proceedings in which the taxpayer applies an existing
dispute resolution framework by means of which he endeavours to have his
conflict brought to an end. With the arbitration procedure in its present shape
the taxpayer falls between two stools: he enjoys neither the advantages of
international arbitration (by having influence on the performance of a clause as
a contracting party) nor the advantages of the traditional judiciary proceedings (by
obtaining judicial protection as a party in the proceedings). With the present
procedure the states have, therefore, brought the taxpayer in an indefinable
position while their own position seems to prevail. The procedure would have
been remarkably more in line with the ECHR standards, if for the design of this
treaty instrument, the states had stuck more to the nature of arbitration as
expressed in the aforementioned cornerstones. In that case, the states could also
have retained their intent, the limitation of loss of tax sovereignty. Compliance
with ECHR standards can still be achieved by safeguarding access to the procedure,
by giving the arbitration commission a more independent character, by giving the
taxpayer influence on the composition of the commission and by effectuating the
outcome of the procedure (see in detail chapter 7, section 7.4 en 7.5).
Finally, the author comes to the external review of international arbitration, which
means the arbitration procedure considered as proceedings on appeal (chapter 6,
section 6.6). In principle, the arbitration commission also pursues objectives of
review procedures, so as to provide legal protection to litigants as well as correc-
tion of errors committed in an earlier proceeding. Ideally, arbitrators should, like a
higher court, review the mutual agreement procedure and its outcome, maintain
the uniform application of the legal provisions (in casu the arm’s length principle
as laid down in the tax conventions) and further legal certainty as well as
development of the law. The research showed that this is not always the case to
the same extent. Dependent on the type of arbitration (for instance, ‘baseball’
arbitration or full review) and on that account on the scope of the examination by
the arbitrators, such supervision may be effectuated to a varying degree. A basic
requirement should, of course, be that in the review procedure the complete
proceeding needs not to be repeated, but can be restricted to the open issues. In
the present form there is no such justifiable restriction on examination. The factual
investigation that the consultation body undertakes during the preliminary
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mutual agreement procedure has an insufficiently objective and transparent
character. The arbitration commission cannot, therefore, rely on the activities of
that body. Apart from a judicial assessment, the arbitrators will also have to deal, if
and in so far as required, with a further examination of the facts. Such an
examination is not always possible within the limited forms of arbitration (think
of ‘baseball’ arbitration or the variant as laid down in the provisions of the OECD
Model Tax Convention in which only those issues are submitted to the commission
that are not resolved by the states by mutual agreement). There is another reason
why the arbitration procedure is not satisfactory as a body of appeal, which
concerns its restricted accessibility. The procedure cannot be invoked indepen-
dently from the mutual agreement procedure for the purpose of further examina-
tion of a denial of mutual consultation by the states or of a mutual agreement
reached. Arbitration, therefore, functions insufficiently as a review procedure.
Further, the constantly changing composition of the arbitration commissions,
which vary for each dispute, impede consistent case law and development of
the law. For this reason it is advisable to give the arbitration commission a more
permanent character and to extend their powers of judicial review. The fact that, in
the framework of an arbitration procedure, in comparison with the mutual
agreement procedure, advices of the arbitration commission are more often
published, may support this suggestion for an adjustment of the commission.
After the analysis in the first two parts of the research with regard to the current
design of the advance pricing agreement procedure, the mutual agreement proce-
dure and the arbitration procedure, part III moves on to the formulation of possible
adjustments of each of these procedures. These adjustments aim to provide proce-
dures that are better equipped to the higher standards of procedural law, and thatwill
ultimately lead to a fairer as well as a more efficient and effective dispute resolution
framework. Their formulation takes into account the character of these procedures as
being governmental and diplomatic processes in order not to lose the mainly
pragmatic advantages that may result from it. The author also makes recommenda-
tions for a more balanced and consistent national and international legal basis. These
recommendations also aim to enhance legal equality in the execution of these
procedures, which at the same time shall also enhance legal certainty. For an insight
in the solutions offered, more in particular in how they are related to the current
design of the three procedures, see chapter 7, section 7.3 and 7.4.
Finally, part III of the research (see in detail chapter 7, section 7.5) discusses a new
scheme for mutual consultation and international arbitration, based on the various
stages of these procedures as described in chapter 3, section 3.5.2, and in chapter 4,
section 4.5.2. It combines the valuable elements of the present dispute resolution
framework with the valuable elements taken from the arbitration rules of two
prominent arbitration institutes, the UNCITRAL and the ICC. Where necessary,
the author has proposed changes in order to create the new scheme. The
diplomatic and delicate character of the transfer pricing procedures are taken
into account, so that in the future this scheme may find acceptance at national
and international level.
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